A “historic breakthrough for LFI” in the eyes of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a “successful strategic gamble” for Médiapart, an “undeniable victory” for commentators like Isabelle Saporta on LCI… On the evening of March 15, the announcement of the good Insoumis scores in the major metropolises had the effect of a thunderclap on the French political landscape. In the space of just a few hours, a narrative took hold in the editorial offices: that of a radical left in full reconquest, back in the saddle just a few months after the tragedy in Lyon and the nauseating outbursts of its leader, which for many should have relegated it to the margins of the electoral game. But is this political victory really backed up by an electoral victory?
What is the real scale of the insoumise surge in the 1st round? Can we really give a national scope to the handful of insoumise lists that have exceeded the 20% threshold? Do these municipal elections signal a rebalancing within the left in favor of La France insoumise?
Based on data from the French Ministry of the Interior, this analysis for Le Figaro and the Fondation Jean Jaurès shows that :
👉 With a presence limited to just 247 communes in metropolitan France, La France insoumise candidates won just 2.6% of the vote across all metropolitan communes.
👉 And if we measure their score in the only towns where LFI ran this year, the insoumises lists show an average of 12.4%, well below the scores measured in these same communes at the last European elections (18.4% in 2024) or the last presidential poll in 2022 (31.6%.).
👉 In the few communes (35) where the results of this first round can be compared with the previous municipal election, which the party “straddled” at the time, the LFI score has nonetheless doubled in six years, rising from 6.2% in 2020 to 13.7% in 2026.
👉 But given the level of presidential election voting intentions currently measured for Jean-Luc Mélenchon – situated around 11 to 12% according to the Ifop-Le Figaro survey of February 26 to 27, 2026 – this 12.4% performance doesn’t appear particularly strong in cities highly favorable to Mélenchonism.
👉 Only three major metropolises voted over 20% for an Insoumise list: Toulouse (28%), Limoges (25%) and Lille (23%). His significant scores in major cities such as Avignon (19%), Rennes (19%), Clermont-Ferrand (17%), Brest (15%) or Montpellier (15%) are insufficient to dream of any victory on his own behalf.
👉 In their direct confrontations with the forces of the traditional left, the France Insoumise
france Insoumise lists come in far behind overall. Where the left (PS-LE-PC) is united, as in Paris, Lyon and Marseille, the LFI lists score around 12%, compared with 30% for the other left-wing forces
👉 Most of its good results were concentrated in working-class suburbs that are very favorable to the movement in terms of their sociological and cultural characteristics: six of the movement’s ten best electoral performances took place in poor suburbs.
👉 LFIFI came out on top in the first round in just 5 communes – Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis), Roubaix (Nord), Étampes (Essonne), La Courneuve (Seine-Saint-Denis), Saint-Fons (Rhône) – ten times less than the RN (53).
👉 In the end, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s party won just one election in the first round – compared with 24 for the RN and its allies and around 350 for the PS and its allies – and its 2 outgoing mayors, in Faches-Thumesnil (39.9%) and Grabels (34.7%), do not go into the second round in a favorable position.
You can find the full analysis on the Fondation Jean-Jaurès website
You can find a summary on the Figaro website
