Since his election as President of the United States, Donald Trump has made a series of sensational announcements and unilateral decisions, dramatically altering the international geopolitical order. At the request of Le Point, Ifop surveyed the French to gauge the effects of this policy on our fellow citizens’ perception of the United States and on relations between the two countries.
- Unprecedented mistrust of a historic ally
In 1994, fifty years after the Normandy landings and five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the victory of the Western camp over the Soviet bloc, 70% of French people considered the United States to be a reliable ally. America was even perceived as the most reliable ally, ahead of Great Britain and Germany, perceived as reliable allies by 65% of those polled. As the graph below shows, the credibility and reliability of the United States were then affected by the invasion of Iraq, justified by a state lie told at the United Nations. An Ifop poll carried out in March 2003 showed that 87% of French people were opposed to the intervention of the Americans and their allies in Iraq, and 69% disapproved completely. In June 2004, more than a year after the launch of the invasion and with Iraq plunged into security chaos, only 55% of French people considered the United States to be a reliable ally.
The image of the United States was to recover under Barack Obama’s two terms in office, since in May 2014 (six years after his first election to the presidency), 77% of French people considered this country a secure ally. Trump’s first victory in 2016 and the policies he will pursue will then damage the image of the United States among the French much more severely than the invasion of Iraq. In March 2017, just a few months after Trump’s inauguration, only 38% of those polled perceived the country as a reliable ally. Under President Biden, this figure rose to 68%, the “normal” low point outside times of tension.
Compared with this low point, the survey we’ve just carried out shows an unprecedented drop, with only 27% of French people now considering the United States to be a reliable ally. This confidence rating is 11 points below what was recorded at the start of Trump’s first term in office, and 28 points down on the measurement taken during the Iraq war. The unprecedented crisis of confidence can be read in the light of this historical perspective, but also with regard to the ratings of Germany and the United Kingdom, perceived as reliable allies by 71% and 65% of the French respectively.
- The United States now seen as an adversary to Russia
While 70% of those polled continue to see the USA as “rather a friendly country” when it comes to combating Islamist terrorism (versus 74% in 2018), only 42% see it as ensuring the security of NATO member countries (down eight points on 2018). More spectacularly, the United States is now perceived “rather as an adversary country” in dealing with Russia by 63% of the French, this proportion having risen by 14 points since 2018 (i.e. two years after Trump’s first election).
Donald Trump’s statements and his attitude towards Vladimir Putin have thus shifted the status of the United States from a “friendly country” to France when dealing with Russia (51% of those polled shared this opinion in 2018) to an adversary country (63% now hold this position), even though the degree of threat posed by Russia is out of all proportion to 2018. At that time, Russia had not yet unleashed its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, and was not perceived as much of a threat as it is today.
The long-standing friendship that the French feel for the American people is, for the time being, resisting the geopolitical upheaval initiated by Donald Trump, with 60% of those polled continuing to feel friendly towards Americans. But this rate was 79% in 2018. Once again, we can measure the extent of the shockwave caused by the thunderous beginnings of the Trump presidency.
- What is the appeal of Trumpism in France?
Unsurprisingly, Trump’s popularity rating among the French population is very low. Only 21% of those polled said they had a good opinion of him, while 79% had a bad opinion, with more than one French person in two (51%) even having a very bad opinion of him, indicating the extent of the rejection this figure arouses in French opinion. While the rejection is widely shared, his popularity has risen slightly since the very beginning of his first term (13% good opinion in November 2016) and is slightly higher than that of G.W Bush at the start of the invasion of Iraq (14% in March 2003).
One French person in five therefore has a good opinion of the President of the United States. What categories of the population are his French supporters drawn from, and what is the profile of Tricolor Trump supporters? First of all, there is a clear gender divide. 27% of men have a good opinion of Trump, compared with just 17% of women. His style, which plays on macho and virilist codes, clearly resonates with some men, while his stance on abortion has alienated many women in the USA and France. The social status of the interviewees also influences their judgment of Trump. Rejection is highest among executives and higher intellectual professions (only 18% in favor) and among intermediate professions (20%), while the working classes are a little more seduced (27% and even 29% among blue-collar workers). As in the United States, Trumpism appeals more to blue-collar workers than to white-collar workers, although no less than 71% of French blue-collar workers have a poor opinion of Trump.
If social class or gender influence the judgment made of the White House tenant, the results of our survey ultimately indicate that it is first and foremost political orientation that structures respondents’ perception of Trump. Only 6% of central bloc voters in the first round of the last legislative elections had a good opinion of him, with the “very bad opinion” score reaching 72% among this electorate. Emmanuel Macron has adopted a very firm stance towards Vladimir Putin, but his electorate clearly expects an uncompromising attitude towards Donald Trump. Rejection is also massive in the New Popular Front electorate, where the unpopularity of the American president reaches 89%, including 79% of very bad opinion. The components of the left regularly express divergences or marked oppositions on various subjects, but hostility to Trump constitutes a unifying base. On the right, rejection is also in the majority, but in lesser proportions. 27% of LR voters in the first round of the legislative elections have a good opinion of Trump, while “very bad opinion” of him is “only” 37% among their ranks. His style and some of his positions are alienating many of his supporters. But the fact that these voters belong to a political current that is part of the extended right-wing family, of which Trump is also a member, explains why some French right-wing sympathizers like Trump. Apart from this philosophical and partial ideological cousinhood, it should also be remembered that part of the French right has always cultivated a militant Atlanticism and a fascination for America. In 2015, for example, Nicolas Sarkozy abandoned the acronym UMP to name the major right-wing formation Les Républicains, precisely the name of the party now headed by Donald Trump.
- The RN electorate between attraction and repulsion
Trumpism is even more pronounced on the right. 56% of Zemmourist sympathizers have a good opinion of him, as do 43% of RN voters in the first round of the legislative elections, against 57% who have a bad opinion. While an absolute majority of the Lepenist electorate dislikes Trump, the Lepenist electoral base appears to be virtually split in two. A strong minority of these voters view Trump favorably, notably because of his stances on immigration and security. The battle he wages in his own country against the “mainstream media”, the “government of judges”, international bodies or the “deep state”, is no doubt not to the displeasure of a section of the frontist electorate, who would dream of the RN doing the same, should it come to power in France. In the same way, Trump’s ability to take rapid, radical decisions on economic protectionism and the dismissal of thousands of civil servants from central government agencies is a response to the demand for a clean break and efficiency that exists among this electorate, who are waiting for the tables to be turned here too. RN leaders are well aware of the appeal of this figure to part of their base. But they are also aware that the threats posed by the United States, both in terms of tariff hikes and military disengagement in Europe, are worrying a majority of their voters, and even more so of the French people. This is why the RN’s line today appears rather convoluted, while the other political formations have, in unison, adopted a much more critical stance towards the new American president.
