1 – A right-wing coalition supported by six out of ten right-wing voters, with support growing stronger the further one moves toward the radical right
Among right-wing voters (1,764 out of 3,000 respondents identifying as center-right, right-wing, or far-right—representing 56% of the French population), 60% say they support Les Républicains, Éric Ciotti’s UDR, the National Rally, and Reconquête governing together after the next national elections, compared with 40% who oppose it. This support varies significantly depending on party affiliation: 73% among those close to LR (including 23% who are “strongly in favor”), 79% among those close to the RN (38%), and 91% among those close to Reconquête (73%). Supporters of LR and the RN accept the coalition, while those of Reconquête actively support it. Support has also declined by 9 points over the past year among LR supporters (82% in October 2025) as well as among RN supporters (88%).
The main source of resistance lies within the center-right: only 38% of its members are in favor (62% are opposed, including 32% who are “strongly opposed”), compared to 74% of those on the right and 75% on the far right. Yet the center-right now accounts for 38% of the right-wing electorate, compared to 28% in 2014. The divide is also evident at the electoral level: the coalition is supported by 72% of François Fillon’s voters in 2017, 73% of Valérie Pécresse’s voters, 77% of Marine Le Pen’s voters, and 91% of Éric Zemmour’s voters in 2022, but only 41% of Emmanuel Macron’s voters. For 2027, 77% of Bruno Retailleau’s potential voters support the coalition (Marine Le Pen: 79%, Éric Zemmour: 88%), compared with only 27% of Édouard Philippe’s supporters (his party, Horizons, is not included in this coalition). Finally, this profile is more common among the working class than among those with a college education: 63% among the working class versus 54% among the upper classes (51% among executives).
2 – A political family that does not see itself as such: the RN is the only component with which half of right-wing voters identify
47% of right-wing voters feel they belong to the same political family as RN voters (27% “definitely”), compared to 34% for LR voters (8% “definitely”) and UDR voters, 27% for Reconquête supporters, and 19% for those of Renaissance and Horizons. More than half do not feel they belong to the same political family as Reconquête voters (52%). This sense of closeness is not mutual. 39% of those close to LR feel they belong to the same political family as RN voters, but only 24% of those close to the RN feel they belong to the same political family as LR voters—a lower percentage than for the UDR (48%) or Reconquête (34%). Supporters of Reconquête overwhelmingly identify with the RN (88%) and the UDR (84%), and significantly less so with LR (41%).
Perceptions of partisan lines shed light on this distance. People on the right view LR as “right-wing” (49%) rather than center-right (27%), but 54% describe the RN as far-right and only 31% as “right-wing.” Even among its own supporters, only 40% describe the RN as “right-wing,” compared to 81% for LR among its own supporters.
3 – A predominantly right-wing population that is shifting toward the center, defining itself first and foremost by work and the economy
56% of French people identify as right-wing (+3 points since 2014). The increase comes from the center-right (21%, compared to 15% in 2014), while the right is declining (23%, compared to 26%) and the far right remains steady at 12% (down from a low of 8% in 2021).
When asked to give a spontaneous response, right-wing politics is primarily associated with jobs, the economy, and governance (26%), ahead of security, order, and authority (18%), values, conservatism, and a vision for France (18%), and immigration, identity, and sovereignty (14%). This hierarchy varies little among supporters of LR (26% for the economy), the RN (25%), and Reconquête (22%). Conservatism, family, and traditions are cited by only 3% of right-wing respondents.
4 – A shared set of values centered on the perception of decline, but divisions over Europe, social issues, and the compatibility of Islam with the Republic
People on the right agree on certain assessments: 92% believe France is in decline and that the justice system is too lenient, 90% criticize excessive “welfare dependency,” 86% believe France has lost its sovereignty, and 83% feel they no longer feel at home as they once did. On the first three items, the gap between supporters of LR, the RN, and Reconquête does not exceed 3 points. This perception is growing across the general population: the view that the country is in decline has risen by 11 points since 2021 (86%), the view that the justice system is too lenient has risen by 9 points since 2017 (85%), the loss of sovereignty by 10 points (77%), and the idea that the unemployed could find work if they really wanted to by 12 points (62%). Voters are also converging on other issues: support for the idea that there is excessive reliance on welfare has risen from 83% to 94% among those close to the RN (from 99% to 92% among those in LR) since January 2025, and the view that “being born in France is not enough to be French” has risen from 75% to 82% among LR supporters since 2021 (RN: 74%). The economy is not a source of division: less government intervention (61% among LR supporters, 65% among RN supporters, 68% among Reconquête supporters) and debt reduction (93%, 84%, 95%) garner similar levels of support.
The divisions center on Europe (“France is stronger thanks to the EU”: 59% among LR supporters, 32% among RN supporters, 18% among Reconquête supporters—a 41-point gap), surrogacy (46%, 59%, and 19%, with the RN taking a more liberal stance than LR), and the death penalty (52%, 83%, and 83%). The incompatibility of Islam with the Republic is also a point of variation (70%, 84%, 93%), and commitment to democracy is less pronounced among Reconquête supporters (71%) than among those of LR (90%) and the RN (87%).
5 – Fragmented representation: the Le Pen–Bardella duo dominates; Bruno Retailleau is the sole link between the various factions
Among right-wing voters, Marine Le Pen (65%) and Jordan Bardella (63%) are seen as best embodying the right, ahead of Bruno Retailleau (53%), Gérald Darmanin (43%), Édouard Philippe and Éric Zemmour (41% each). Among those close to LR, Retailleau leads (83%) ahead of Gérald Darmanin (63%) and Édouard Philippe (59%), but Jordan Bardella (57%) and Marine Le Pen (55%) exceed the majority. Bruno Retailleau is also the only one to meet all thresholds: 83% among LR supporters, 67% among Reconquête supporters, and 46% among RN supporters. Édouard Philippe (59% among LR supporters, 25% among RN supporters, 12% among Reconquête supporters) and Gabriel Attal (41%, 24%, 8%) do not meet the RN and Reconquête thresholds.
The pool of potential voters switching from LR to Marine Le Pen is larger than that switching from the RN to Bruno Retailleau: 58% of those close to LR find at least one reason to vote for her (immigration, assessment of France’s current state), compared to 48% of those close to the RN who do so for him (security, immigration). Marine Le Pen, whom 90% of her 2022 voters intend to support again, also benefits from Reconquête’s fluidity: among Éric Zemmour’s 2022 voters, 40% would remain loyal, but 35% would switch their support to her. Overall, 53% of right-wing voters do not identify with any reason to vote for Retailleau, 37% for Le Pen, and 65% for Zemmour.
6 – For 2027, Retailleau primarily captures the legacy of the traditional right—which is split among Philippe, Lisnard, and Le Pen—while Le Pen also draws in voters from the radical right
The 2027 voting intention projections based on past voting patterns confirm the traditional right’s difficulty in uniting. Bruno Retailleau leads among voters who supported François Fillon in 2017 (29%) and Valérie Pécresse in 2022 (33%), but is far from capturing the majority of them. Édouard Philippe retains 20% (Fillon) and 19% (Pécresse), David Lisnard 14% and 11%, and Marine Le Pen 14% and 13%.
The Macronist electorate is divided differently: Édouard Philippe attracts 26% (2017 voters) and 30% (2022), while Gabriel Attal attracts 12% and 14%. Marine Le Pen attracts 12% and 11%, while Bruno Retailleau attracts 7% in both cases.
On the far right, Marine Le Pen is the big winner. She retains 86% of her 2017 voters and 90% of her 2022 voters. She also attracts 35% of Éric Zemmour’s 2022 voters, only 40% of whom remain loyal to him (7% would go to Bruno Retailleau, 6% to David Lisnard). Nicolas Dupont-Aignan’s voters are shifting to Marine Le Pen at a rate of 23% in 2022 (22% in 2017, and 14% to Zemmour), with just under half remaining loyal (49% in 2022, 28% in 2017).
