No sooner had the campaign kicked off than religion emerged as one of the first battlegrounds in the presidential race. In the three weeks since the campaign began, we’ve seen a series of developments: the National Rally’s announcement of fines for women wearing the veil (August 30), confirmed the very next day in the form of a referendum on a “major law” including “the criminalization of the Islamist veil in public spaces”; a response from Mathilde Panot promising to lift the ban on the abaya in schools; Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s mea culpa, in which he described his past opposition to the veil as a “terrible mistake”; and finally, Éric Zemmour’s proposal to ban the kippah on the street.
Following closely on the heels of the National Assembly’s resolution targeting the Muslim Brotherhood (January 2026) and the Senate’s adoption of Bruno Retailleau’s bill against “Islamist entryism” (May 2026), this sequence has reignited a “mirror configuration”[1] in which both the RN and LFI are capitalizing on the issue of Islam, forcing other political forces to take a stance on their terms. It is in this context that Marianne commissioned Ifop to conduct a major survey to gauge where public opinion truly stands on these issues and, above all, whether voters follow their candidates’ lead.
To this end, Ifop conducted a study of exceptional scope—a representative national sample of nearly 10 , 000 French citizens —allowing for a comparison of the candidates’ positions with those of their own electorates, but also to analyze subpopulations rarely surveyed on this scale: Muslims—including both veiled and non-veiled women—French people of the Jewish faith, people whose fathers were born in the Maghreb or sub-Saharan Africa, women who identify as feminists, and LGBT individuals.
In light of this survey—by far the most comprehensive ever conducted on the subject—public opinion remains largely committed to a “militant” form of secularism—restrictive regarding religious symbols, hostile to political Islam, and anticlerical even with regard to the Concordat—but this majority is composed of older generations whom younger people no longer follow. It also reveals a series of discrepancies between party leaderships and their voters: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, contradicted by his base on Islamism and abandoned by it over his separatist platform; a left-wing government that votes in the National Assembly against what its supporters believe; and a National Rally whose voters are more anticlerical than their candidate.
🔑 KEY FIGURES FROM THE STUDY 🔑
Opposition to the veil in public remains in the majority, but is eroding as generations change
1- Opposition to wearing the veil in public remains the majority view (53%) but has declined by 10 percentage points since 2012, while the proportion of French people who support it has tripled over the same period (22%, compared to 7% in 2012).
2- The shift is generational: 62% of those under 25 approve of wearing the veil in public—three times more than the French population as a whole and three times more than young people in 2010 (19%) — with Mélenchon’s electorate being the only one where a majority approves of wearing the veil (62% of voters in 2027).
Broad support for “sector-specific” bans, but more measured support for the referendum on the veil
3- All measures to ban the veil discussed since the start of the school year are supported by a majority of French people: lifting the ban on the abaya is widely rejected (75%), while the ban on the veil for girls under 15 is widely supported (72%).
4- Support is equally strong for banning religious symbols in sports competitions (72%) and for Le Pen’s proposal regarding universities (69%). Even the referendum proposed by the nationalist candidate on banning the veil at all ages is supported by a majority of the 10,000 French people surveyed (60%).
The fight against Islamism: a consensus spanning from the left to the “Insoumis” electorate
5- The ban on organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (80%) and the creation of a criminal offense of “Islamist infiltration” (74%) enjoy overwhelming support, even among supporters of parties whose lawmakers voted against the January resolution: 81% in the Socialist Party (PS), 85% in the French Communist Party (PCF), and 80% among the Greens.
6- More unexpectedly, one in two Muslims (48%) as well as a majority of Mélenchon voters (56%) support banning organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood—asign that the accusation of Islamophobia leveled against this measure is far from being shared by those most directly affected.
A form of secularism based on separation, for which Le Pen’s electorate has become the leading supporter
7- The anticlerical measures in Mélenchon’s 2022 platform are widely supported by the French public—repeal of the Alsace-Moselle Concordat (65%), a ban on public funding of religious groups (64%) —but it is among his own voters (56% and 49%) that these measures receive the least support.
8- As for the ban on wearing a kippah in public (58%) proposed by Éric Zemmour, it garners as much support as the ban on the hijab (60%), a sign that the demand for discretion targets all religious visibility and not just Islam.
Mélenchon identified as the main threat to secularism… except by young people
9- When asked to identify the candidate who would pose the greatest threat to secularism if elected to the Élysée, the French point to Jean-Luc Mélenchon (43%) ahead of Marine Le Pen (35%), especially among Jewish respondents (65%). But this assessment is reversed among Muslims (57%) and young people (54% name Le Pen, 25% Mélenchon).
A Marine Le Pen victory feared by religious minorities and contested in advance
10- If Marine Le Pen is elected next May, nearly two-thirds of adherents of minority religions (e .g., Islam, Judaism, Protestantism, etc.) fear an increase in discrimination against them (63%) or a restriction on their religious freedom (61%), a fear that rises to 81% among Muslims.
11- In this scenario, four in ten French people say they are prepared to refuse to obey laws they deem unjust (41%), to go on strike (38%), or to protest (36%)— a proportion that rises to three-quarters of the “Insoumis” electorate (75%).
12- If Marine Le Pen were to win, more than one in five French people (21%) would even consider leaving the country, with this reaction affecting nearly one in two Muslims (46%) and more than four out of ten current Jean-Luc Mélenchon voters (43%).
| François Kraus’s perspective : | |
| While the candidates’ proposals to restrict the visibility of religion in public spaces clearly respond to a demand for religious discretion, their support in public opinion appears distinctly fragile. For the real divide is not only partisan; it is also generational, with young people rejecting all bans, including that on the abaya in schools.
It is in light of this divide that Le Pen’s gamble must be assessed. The risk of a referendum on the veil is more social than electoral. Eight out of ten Muslims anticipate an increase in discrimination; three-quarters of the “Unsubmissive” electorate say they are ready to disobey, go on strike, or protest; and nearly one in two Muslims—as well as one in two Jews—would consider leaving France. All in all, it is difficult not to be skeptical about the ability of secular legislation to maintain its sociological and political foundation in the future. The situation could always reverse in the event of new tragedies (e.g., terrorist attacks, riots…), but the trend is moving in the same direction. The 2027 presidential election could be the last one won on the basis of “militant secularism”; subsequent elections will likely hinge on the ability to redefine—for a “fragmented” France—what the word “secularism” actually means… In any case, on this issue, Jean-Luc Mélenchon may have lost today’s battle, but he holds all the cards to win tomorrow’s.
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[1] Anne-Sylvie Sprenger, “The French Presidential Election and Islam: The Great Exploitation,” Le Temps, September 17, 2026.
