The “Bof generation”? A political radioscopy of teenagers aged 15 to 17

In 2026, what are the values and political positions of teenagers? Are they more progressive or reactionary than previous generations? How do they compare with their parents at the same age? To gain a better understanding of these young people at the age of high school, Ifop conducted a major survey for Elle among girls and boys aged 15, 16 and 17 today. Based on a representative sample of 1,028 teenagers aged 15 to 17 living in mainland France, the survey sheds new light on the profound changes taking place in French youth. By reconstructing historical series, this study highlights a phenomenon of growing individualism among teenagers, reflected in a lack of interest in traditional political parties, an indifference to ideological cleavages and an increased appreciation of personal values such as family, friendship or money. The data reveal a refocusing on the private sphere, and a growing refusal to make sacrifices for the country.nnThe great divorce from political partiesn1 – The low level of politicization among young people can be seen first and foremost in their distancing from traditional political forces, which is far more marked than among adults. For example, 45% of young people say they don’t feel close to any political party, twice the proportion of adults (25%). n2 – Today’s indifference to ideological positions is also more marked than it was thirty years ago. Indeed, 35% of young people don’t see themselves politically on the left/right axis, a proportion twice as high as in 1994 (18%).nnA trend towards “softness” driven by boysn3 – Another major finding of this survey is that French youth at this age tend to lean more to the right than in the past. Whereas in 1994, 15-18 year-olds were predominantly on the left (54% vs. 46% on the right), the balance of power has reversed: 56% of teenagers are now on the right vs. 44% on the left.n4 – However, this trend is not uniform and reveals an early political “gender gap”: 64% of boys position themselves on the right (versus only 36% on the left), while girls remain anchored on the left at 53%. This 28-point gap reflects gender polarization from adolescence onwards, a phenomenon that can be seen to precede entry into higher education.nDespite international tensions, patriotism appears more timid than in the past n5 – Individualism manifests itself in young people’s growing refusal to make the ultimate sacrifice in the event of an invasion: they are less willing today to put their lives at risk for France (23%) than they were forty years ago (41% in 1984). This figure falls to 5% among the extreme left and 13% among Muslims, revealing the weak sense of national belonging in certain sectors of the youth population.nnYoung people’s retreat into the private sphere goes hand in hand with an increased appreciation of money and a more distanced relationship with work and progressn6 – An analysis of young people’s values over the last 40 years reveals a retreat into the private sphere, accompanied by an increased appreciation of money. Indeed, while family (98%) and friendship (97%) remain the values most favored by young people, we also observe a rise in materialistic pragmatism, illustrated by the growing value given to money: +14 points since 1984 to reach 50%.n7 – Conversely, there has been a certain disenchantment with work (-4 points since 1994) and above all with scientific progress (-16 points), which now only appeals to 44% of young people. And this hierarchy of values is in line with the logic of class: work is judged “very important” by 54% of young people whose parent is an executive, compared with 43% of young blue-collar workers.nThe religious variable, a factor of cultural conservatism in a generally progressive youth populationn8 – While young people are progressive on abortion (91% consider it acceptable) and homosexuality (73%), they remain divided on the death penalty and express a clear rejection of criticism of religions. The majority of young people consider criticism of religion to be unacceptable (58%), compared with just 30% who accept it, with the strongest rejection of any criticism of religion among working-class people (61% to 65%), practicing Catholics (76%) and Muslims (92%). n9 – However, this consensus masks deep denominational cleavages: young people’s moral values appear all the more conservative the more they are influenced by religious morality. Young Muslims, for example, are among the most resistant to LGBT rights: 49% of young Muslims find same-sex relationships unacceptable (vs. 7% of those of no religion), and 57% find gender reassignment unacceptable (vs. 21% of those of no religion). nRegal concerns replace economic anxietyn10 – While 66% of teenagers say they are worried about the future (down sharply from 87% in 1994), the nature of their fears has changed radically. Indeed, the primary source of concern for young people today is war (30% vs. 16% in 1994), followed by insecurity (25% vs. 1% in 1994) and global pollution (16% vs. 5%). Whereas AIDS (24%) and unemployment (18%) were the top two sources of anxiety 30 years ago, this is no longer the case (0% and 8% respectively).nThis shift in the register of youthful anxieties – from socio-economic concerns to regal and environmental issues – bears witness to a generation marked by the return of war to Europe and the multiplication of attacks, but also by the relative trivialization of mass unemployment, which no longer constitutes a specific anxiety-provoking horizon.nnRead the article on the study:nhttps://www.elle.fr/Societe/Les-enquetes/Famille-politique-argent-que-pensent-les-15-17-ans-Notre-sondage-exclusif