Should the March 2026 municipal elections be seen as a precursor to the 2027 presidential election? Will voters seize upon it as a life-size test, likely to structure the competition to come? To answer these questions, a study conducted by Institut Terram and Ifop among 10,000 people aged 18 and over offers particularly detailed analytical possibilities, while providing a historical perspective on several structuring indicators. This approach goes beyond the simple monographic approach, city by city, to offer an overall reading of the election across all territorial strata. But this Institut Terram X Institut Ifop report also incorporates the main local polls published in recent months, in order to provide a concrete assessment of the balance of power in towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, where the electoral offering most closely mirrors national cleavages.
TO READ THE FULL TERRAM STUDY, CLICK ON THE LINK BELOW:
https://institut-terram.org/publications/municipales-les-premices-de-la-presidentielle/
KEY FIGURES :
👉 Indications of a “brown wave”? The RN is by far the party whose voters most want to win the municipal elections
– On the left, the proportion of voters hoping for an Ecologist victory is almost half as high today (5%) as in 2020 (8%), unlike the lists of the Socialist Party (11%, +3 points) and La France insoumise (9%, +5 points), whose hopes for victory have risen significantly from one election to the next.
– Formations associated with the government in recent years have seen their support drop: -10 points for Renaissance and MoDem (6%), -3 points for Les Républicains (10%), without being offset by favors for the center-right parties tested for the first time this year: 4% for Horizons and UDI.
– On the right, the number of voters wishing to see the RN win is twice as high today (28%) as in 2020 (13%). In total, adding Reconquête (3%), the radical right thus attracts a third of victory wishes (31%), against 20% for the central bloc (RE-MD-HO-UDI-LR) andaquarter (26%) for the lefts (LFI-PCF-PS-PP-LÉ).
💡Theviewof François Kraus for Terram: “Strong as it is, this national dynamic in favor of the RN does not have as much effect in a “France of metropolises” that remains sociologically unfavorable to it. In the twenty or so towns of over 100,000 inhabitants surveyed in recent months, RN-backed lists have made significant progress – an average of around 8 points compared with 2020 – which would enable most of them to continue into the second round this time. RN/UDR candidates thus appear to be in a position to play the leading roles in most of the major cities around the Mediterranean – Perpignan (+8 points, 44%), Nîmes (+7 points, 21%), Marseille (+13 points, 32%), Toulon (+24 points, 39%) and Nice (+24 points, 41%) – to which we can add medium-sized towns in the same trend, such as Béziers (61%, -8 points) or Orange. Elsewhere, on the other hand, their presence in the metropolises will be much more symbolic, even if their continued presence in the second round could, as in Le Havre, cause the center or right-wing lists to lose out by depriving them of vote transfers to the left.”
👉From“order in the streets and in the accounts”… When the hierarchy of voting determinants draws an electoral terrain most favorable to the Right
This dynamic in favor of the RN appears all the stronger for the fact that it goes hand in hand with a programmatic physiognomy of the ballot borrowing themes dear to the radical right.
– Three of the five themes that will most influence the French vote on March 15 are linked to security: the safety of property and people (+7 points since March 2020, at 75%), the fight against incivilities (68%) and the fight against drug trafficking (64%).
– And this rise in importance of security issues is due to the fact that they are now a cross-party issue. Far from being the prerogative of right-wing voters (RN, LR), they are also at the top of the voting list for centrist voters (77%) and rank 5th among NFP voters in the last legislative elections (56%).
– Behind access to healthcare, which is the other major issue (74%, +15 points since 2020), a second programmatic block favorable to the moderate right also emerges: the management of communal finances and debt (70%, +4 points) and the level of local taxes (64%, +4 points).
💡Theviewof François Kraus for Terram : “The hierarchy of voting determinants thus draws an electoral terrain objectively more favorable to the right than to the forces of the left. This is due in particular to a “partial de-ideologization of regalian issues” (…), with security (…) losing its right-wing character to become a transpartisan issue (…) This does not mechanically prejudge the electoral outcome, which will also depend on local variables (…) But the thematic structure of the ballot appears clearly oriented. In other words, in 2026, the Right enjoys an environment of issues consistent with their traditional registers of credibility.”
👉Versun“reflux de la vague verte” ? Green mayors clearly threatened by a sanction vote
Six years after the 2020 electoral sequence, the question of a reflux of the green wave deserves to be asked in the light of the available indicators.
– A retrospective misalignment with the choice made in 2020 is first and foremost very strong in communes held by ecologists: the proportion of voters regretting having voted for their mayor is three times higher among voters of EELV or other ecologist mayors (30%) than the national average: 13% on average in the 35,000 communes in metropolitan France.
– This strong feeling of bitterness, which is rarely observed for parties so far removed from government action, means that ecologist mayors are most at risk of a sanction vote: barely one in four voters (24%) living in towns run by ecologist executives would like to see them reappointed, half as many as the national average (55%).
– This unfavorable national trend is reflected in most local pre-election surveys. Of the six cities currently headed by mayors from or close to the Ecologist party, four have recorded a drop in voting intentions compared to the first round in 2020 (e.g.: -8 points in Strasbourg, -5 points in Lyon, -4 points in Annecy…). There is also a downward trend in cities where they held a strong position (-6 points in Lille, -9 points in Dijon…).
💡Theviewpointof François Kraus for Terram : “The “green wave”, the end of a conjunctural artifact? Interpreting the current dynamics invites us to revisit the “green wave” of 2020. This wave unfolded in an exceptional context: record abstention in the first round, a climate of anxiety linked to the pandemic, over-representation of an urban electorate, highly educated and strongly mobilized around environmental issues. In 2026, with an expected turnout of around 60%, the sociological structure of the electorate is normalizing. The environmentalist base, more concentrated in specific urban segments, is mechanically diluted in a broader electorate.”
👉 “All against LFI”? The scope and limits of Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s communist turn
While it had “straddled” the 2020 municipal elections, LFI has clearly invested more in this ballot, multiplying autonomous lists in the 1st round. But while the indicators confirm a real national dynamic, they also show the limits of its strategy in the second round.
– The favourable momentum for LFI observed on a national scale via the “wish to win” indicator (+5 points in six years) is confirmed in towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, a sign that its communalist turn is not only infusing the working-class suburbs. In the dozen or so towns where the political offer remains comparable to that of 2020, the progression of LFI lists is clear: +5 points on average, for a score now approaching 13%. In the twenty or so large cities studied, the average voting intention for LFI lists is 12.5%. Some cases in particular illustrate this dynamic. In Rouen, the Insoumise list is credited with 18%, 14 points more than in 2020. Strasbourg (+7 points, 10%), Lille (+7 points, 16%) and Dijon (+6 points, 11%) also confirm this progression.
– For a group whose leader exceeded 30% in 23 towns of over 100,000 inhabitants during the last presidential election, these trends are nonetheless disappointing. Its leadership is content with very limited ambitions (e.g. Roubaix, La Courneuve and Évry), and no local polls yet suggest any kind of victory.
– Indeed, LFI is currently the party whose victory is most feared: 36% of voters fear its victory in their commune, compared with 31% for that of the RN.
💡Theviewof François Kraus for Terram: “(…) the gap between presidential performance (…) and municipal voting intentions remains marked. This discrepancy is not due to a lack of investment – the 2026 installation is out of all proportion to that of 2020 – but to a constant in local elections: differential abstention first affects electorates that are highly politicized on national issues. As a result, while LFI lists frequently cross the 10% threshold enabling them to maintain their position, their vote reserves appear limited, making any dynamic of victory difficult…. “
👉Therightand the legacy of Macronism… Optimism on a national scale not found in “metropolitan France”
Beyond the elements relating to the election stakes, several national indicators suggest that the context is rather favorable for the right and center-right, particularly in those towns of 10,000 to 100,000 inhabitants where they are in a dominant position.
– Firstly, the renewed mobilization seems a priori to favor the return to the polls of electorates traditionally anchored to the right and center. Indeed, the study shows a very clear remobilization of older voters (+22 points, to 72%) and/or those living in affluent suburbs (+27 points, to 62%), who had deserted the polls six years ago because of health risks. On the other hand, this general upturn in turnout (+15.5 points on average) is expected to be weaker in left-leaning segments, such as young people (+9 points, to 39%), voters in working-class suburbs (+10 points, to 52%) and those in urban centers (+12 points, to 59%).
– Secondly, the desire for re-election appears to be more favorable to right-wing mayors (LR, DVD): 59% of voters with a right-wing mayor would like to see him or her re-elected, compared to 52% of voters living in a commune run by the left or center-left. However, this difference can have a significant impact in tight configurations.
– Long supported by the center, the rhetoric of the managerial mayor above party politics is also gaining ground in people’s minds: 58% of voters will base their decision on the personality of the candidates, as opposed to 42% on their political orientation. However, municipal apoliticalism, by localizing the issues at stake, makes it possible to defuse the logic of nationalizing the ballot, which can be to the detriment of forces associated with an unpopular government.
– Finally, in a context where the ruling coalition lacks an embodiment that can serve as a “punching bag” at the local level, the “sanction vote” logic looks set to be on a par with previous ballots: only 23% of voters say they want to sanction the national executive through their municipal vote, a level equivalent to that measured in 2014 (23%) or 2008 (20%). Conversely, the desire to localize the ballot is still very much in the majority, with two out of three voters (66%) declaring that they will base their decision on local considerations.
– However, this national dynamic in favor of the right is not evident in the major cities. Moreover, partisan recompositions complicate the readability of these trends. Nonetheless, if we consider the general trend emerging from local polls, the findings appear less than favorable in towns where outgoing mayors are associated with Macronism’s record.
💡Theviewof François Kraus for Terram: “However strong it may be, this national momentum in favor of the RN does not have as much effect in “metropolitan France”, which remains sociologically unfavorable to it. In the twenty or so towns of over 100,000 inhabitants surveyed over the past few months, the RN-backed lists have made significant progress – an average of around 8 points compared with 2020 – which would enable most of them to continue into the second round this time. RN/UDR candidates thus appear to be in a position to play the leading roles in most of the major cities around the Mediterranean – Perpignan (+8 points, 44%), Nîmes (+7 points, 21%), Marseille (+13 points, 32%), Toulon (+24 points, 39%) and Nice (+24 points, 41%) – to which we can add medium-sized towns in the same trend, such as Béziers (61%, -8 points) or Orange. Elsewhere, on the other hand, their presence in the metropolises will be much more symbolic, even if their continued presence in the second round could, as in Le Havre, cause the center or right-wing lists to lose out by depriving them of vote carryovers to the left”
With the presidential election just a year away, the elections of March 15 and 22, 2026 will be spontaneously interpreted by many observers as a “test match” before 2027. This is particularly true for radical parties such as LFI and the RN, which are currently excluded from running municipal councils, and which (…) can only hope to win additional elected representatives. However, our survey suggests that the majority of voters will continue to base their choice on local variables: the proposed project, the record of the outgoing team, the personalities of the heads of list. Explicitly ideological considerations (partisan etiquette, support for or sanction of the government) appear less asserted, even if they may structure part of the behavior in the background. Detailed analysis of the data thus highlights a structural tension between local and national logic. Once again, the ballot is likely to operate at two speeds: in small and medium-sized towns, the anchoring of incumbents and personal proximity will largely dominate; in large towns, politicization will be more marked, and results will inevitably be subject to national extrapolation.
The momentum in favor of the RN is all the stronger for the fact that it goes hand in hand with a programmatic physiognomy of the ballot borrowing themes dear to the radical right. But a dynamic of opinion in favor of the right will not necessarily translate into a massive swing in the major cities. (…) The frequent maintenance of RN lists could reduce carry-over to right-wing or center lists, and mechanically increase the chances of the left in certain configurations. Of course, the maintenance of LFI lists could also penalize left-wing executives, but the effect is potentially less significant given the more limited number of unsubmissive candidates, a smaller average electoral base and the possibility of “technical mergers” (…).
Ultimately, these municipal elections will undoubtedly provide a useful barometer of the political climate, but they will not constitute a full-scale primary for the presidential election. (…) The municipal elections are part of a different electoral grammar: a different voting system, a different timeframe, a different mobilization logic. They make it possible to identify trends and dynamics, but not to anticipate a national verdict. Historical experience, from 1977 to 2020, reminds us that municipal elections obey their own springs and that the presidential election responds to a specific logic: that of the encounter between a candidate, a context and a country at a given moment. Caution is therefore called for. It always does, when it comes to elections.
François Kraus, Director of Ifop’s Politics / News Department
TO READ THE FULL TERRAM STUDY, CLICK ON THE LINK BELOW:
https://institut-terram.org/publications/municipales-les-premices-de-la-presidentielle/
