At a time when questions about the integration of Muslims occupy such a prominent place in public debate, it has to be said that there are few, if any, surveys that can accurately measure the evolution of this population’s relationship with religion over time. This survey of over 1,000 people of Muslim faith sheds new light on the profound changes that have taken place in French Islam over the past forty years. By reconstructing historical series going back to the 1980s, this study highlights a phenomenon of “re-Islamization” that is particularly affecting new generations, and is accompanied by a worrying rise in support for Islamist theses. Far from confirming claims of secularization among French Muslims, the data reveal on the contrary an intensification of religious practices, a hardening of positions on questions of co-education, and a growing sympathy for the radical currents of political Islam.
A) THE IMPORTANCE OF MUSLIMS IN THE FRENCH RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE HAS GROWN SLOWLY BUT STEADILY OVER THE PAST FORTY YEARS
1 – The proportion of Muslims in the adult French population has risen from 0.5% in 1985 to 7% in 2025, making Islam France’s second-largest religion after Catholicism (43%) but ahead of Protestantism (4%). This steady growth is part of a wider context of recomposition of the religious landscape, marked by the decline of Catholicism and the rise of the “no religion” (37.5%).
Ifop’s point of view: The results of this study do not go in the direction of the “Great Replacement” preachers, who for years have been asserting the idea of a massive presence of Muslims in France, to the point where the French have come to believe that they represent 31% of the French population (Ipsos, 2016)! In reality, our survey, which is based on a more exhaustive sample than the TEO survey (INED-INSEE 2019-2020) and more robust than the EVS (2018), evaluates the proportion of Muslims at a much more limited level (7%). Nor does our study confirm the thesis of a “Muslim exception” in the religious landscape: the dynamics of evangelical Protestantism shatter the clichés around a French Islam that would be the only religion to follow a trajectory of religious revitalization. However, it also illustrates the “fragmentation” of a French society prey to the accelerated decline of the “Catholic matrix” that ensured France’s cultural unity, and to the assertion of islands whose cultural and normative referents diverge from the majority population (Fourquet, 2019).
B) A MUSLIM POPULATION UNDERGOING A PROCESS OF “RE-ISLAMIZATION”, ILLUSTRATED BY A HIGH DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY AND A STEADY INCREASE IN RELIGIOUS PRACTICES SINCE THE 2000S
2 – Muslims display a degree of religiosity well above that of other religions – 80% declare themselves “religious”, compared with 48% on average among followers of other religions -, particularly among young people: 87% among young Muslims aged 15 to 24.
👉 One Muslim in four (24%) even claims to be “extremely” or “very” religious (versus 12% in other faiths). Here too, this intense religiosity peaks among the under-25s (30%), revealing a generational gap that completely reverses classic secularization patterns.
Ifop’s view: This over-religiosity among Muslims as generations change, already suggested by various studies and surveys (Valeurs 2018 study), now clearly distinguishes the Muslim pole from the rest of the French religious landscape. However, this strengthening of religiosity is above all part of a process of “religious reaffiliation” of part of Muslim youth with traditionalist Islam.
3 – Attendance at places of worship and the practice of prayer have risen sharply over the past 40 years, particularly among younger people. Just as weekly mosque attendance has risen from 16% in 1989 to 35% in 2025, daily prayer practice has also increased between 1989 (41%) and 2025 (62%), also peaking among young people under 25: 67%.
4 – Compliance with dietary injunctions is also more assiduous than forty years ago, particularly among the youngest generations. Indeed, observance of the Ramadan fast throughout the month is particularly strict (73%, compared with 60% in 1989), especially among young people where this pillar of Islam has become almost universal (83% among 18-24 year olds).
👉 This rigidification of dietary practices is also illustrated by the non-consumption of alcohol: 79% of abstainers in 2025, compared with 65% in 1989, while alcohol consumption falls to just 12% among young people under 25.
Ifop’s view: These data paint a picture of a French Muslim population gripped by a movement of religious reaffiliation, particularly affecting the younger generations. Far from following the classic model of secularization, Muslims in France, and especially the youngest among them, are on the contrary witnessing a strong reaffirmation of their identity through the intensification of religious practices. This phenomenon, already observed in the 1990s by researchers such as Gilles Kepel, has now been translated into figures, confirming not only its scale but also, and above all, its durability over the generations.
C) THIS HIGH DEGREE OF RELIGIOSITY GOES HAND IN HAND WITH A RISE IN ORTHOPRAXIS IN TERMS OF DIET, CLOTHING AND GENDER RELATIONS
5 – Wearing the veil remains a minority and irregular practice among Muslim women overall – 31% wear it, but only 19% systematically – but it is becoming increasingly commonplace among young people: one in two Muslim women aged 18 to 24 now veils (45%), three times more than in 2003 (16%) – the year of the great debate on banning it from public schools.
👉 Admittedly, veiling is above all the result of a religious injunction (80%), but it also expresses a growing pride of belonging – 38% do it to show “their belonging to their religion” – and a need for protection from the pressures weighing on women in the public space: 44% say they wear it “not to attract the gaze of men”, 42% “to feel safe”, 15% “not to be perceived as an immodest woman”, and 2% “under direct pressure from relatives”.
Ifop’s point of view: for many veiled women, especially young women who are most subject to sexist pressure in the public space, wearing the veil is sometimes an expression of “defensive modesty”, confirming the hypothesis that it may ultimately play a role of “invisibility cloak” for those who wish to limit the risks of pressure, stigmatization or aggression linked to their gender.
Ifop’s view: the rejection of these forms of physical or visual contact with the other sex, like the wearing of the veil, bears witness to a “gender separatism” involving above all the invisibilization of the female body and a rigidification of male-female relations. Carried by the most rigorist fringe of the Muslim population, these practices are probably part of a dynamic of identity reaffirmation in which they function as markers of distinction in a society perceived as hostile or assimilating. But this rejection of co-education also appears to be in total opposition to the liberal mores dominant in the West, and the values of equality and co-education promoted by the Republic…
6 – At odds with the liberal mores dominant in the West, the application of gender separatism is far from marginal: 43% of Muslims refuse at least one form of physical or visual contact with the other sex, including one in three (33%) who refuse to kiss, 20% who refuse to go into a mixed-gender swimming pool, 14% who refuse to shake hands with a person of the opposite sex, and 6% who refuse to be treated by a doctor of the opposite sex. However, the strength of this rejection of co-education among young people suggests that gender relations will become more rigid as the generations turn over.
D) ISLAM’S GROWING ABILITY TO SET RULES FOR THE DAILY LIVES OF INDIVIDUALS GOES HAND IN HAND WITH A GROWING DESIRE TO LIVE IN A FRENCH SOCIETY THAT CONFORMS TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW
7 – Contrary to trends observed in other religions, a form of “religious absolutism” is reflected in a widespread rejection of science: 65% of Muslims believe that “religion is more right” than science on the question of the creation of the world, more than three times as many as in other religions (19%).
8 – A fundamentalist vision of Islam is also becoming commonplace, with the idea that the rules of one’s religion take precedence over others. In an arbitration on subjects such as ritual slaughter or inheritance, the proportion of Muslims who would favor respect for the rules of their religion has risen sharply in thirty years (+16 points since 1995, to 44%), while those who would favor French laws are clearly down on 1995 (49%, -13 points).
👉 Another sign of a certain fundamentalist vision of Sharia law: almost one Muslim in two (46%) believes that Islamic law should be applied in the countries where they live, 15% of them “in full regardless of the country in which they live” and 31% “in part” by adapting it to the rules of the country where they live.
Ifop’s point of view: These data provide grist for the mill for those who fear that the Muslim population is developing into a “counter-society”, i.e. that it is seeking to organize its daily life according to religious norms distinct from, or even opposed to, those of the majority society. This trend, far from diminishing over time, seems on the contrary to be growing stronger generation after generation, driven by a youth increasingly eager to mark its Muslim identity in the face of a French society perceived as hostile.
E) WIDELY MORE WIDESPREAD THAN IN THE 90S, ISLAMISM HAS NOW ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A MULTI-FACETED CURRENT OF THOUGHT, DOMINATED BY BROTHERISM
9 – Fundamentalism has won over the minds of more than one in three Muslims: 38% of Muslims approve of all or part of “Islamist” positions in 2025, a proportion twice as high as those who shared “fundamentalist” positions some thirty years ago (19% in 1998).
10 – In France, the hexagonal Islamist movement is criss-crossed by multiple currents, dominated by the influential Muslim Brotherhood: one Muslim in three (33%) displays sympathy for at least one Islamist movement, including 24% for the Muslim Brotherhood, 9% for Salafism, 8% for Wahhabism, 8% for Tabligh, 6% for Takfir and 3% for Jihadism.
👉 One in three young people (32%) say they are close to the Muslim Brotherhood current of thought, a sign of influence in the new generations, which contradicts the idea that this movement is ageing.
FRANCOIS KRAUS’ VIEW OF THE SURVEY
This survey paints a clear picture of a Muslim population undergoing a process of re-Islamization, structured around rigorous religious norms and increasingly tempted by an Islamist political project.
Instead of following the usual pattern of secularization, Muslims in France – especially the younger ones – are witnessing a strong reaffirmation of their identity, with intensified religious practices, more rigid gender relations and growing support for Islamist theories.
What’s most striking about these results is the consistency of the generational gradient: on almost every indicator (religiosity, religious practices, veils, rejection of co-education, rejection of science, primacy of religious law, adherence to Islamism), young Muslims are systematically more rigorous and radical than their elders. This trend suggests that, far from diminishing over time, the process of re-Islamization will, on the contrary, increase as the generations renew themselves.
Whether this dynamic is reversible remains to be seen. The survey suggests that, at this stage, nothing seems to be stopping the re-Islamization process. On the contrary, all indicators point to a strengthening of these trends in the years ahead. Against this backdrop, the question of the integration of Muslims in France and their adherence to republican values has taken on a new urgency, calling for political responses that go far beyond security or repressive approaches alone.
François Kraus, Director of Ifop’s “Politics / News” Department
In this interview, Frédéric Dabi explains what Ifop’s culture is, and provides keys to understanding the current situation, far from caricatures. It’s a useful, accessible talk that helps us grasp the nuances behind the figures.
